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GUANTANAMO AND CITIZENSHIP: AN UNJUST TICKET HOME?
Rory T. Hood t
"Trying to get Uganda to take an interest is pretty difficult; [Jamal Abdul-
lah Kiyemba has] been here since he was 14. 1 am asking the [Foreign Of-
fice] whether they will allow him to apply for citizenship from Guan-
tanamo Bay. If you are out of the country for more than two years, it can
be counted against you. He probably has now been-but not of his own
free will.'
-Louise Christian - Atty. representing Jamal Abdullah Kiyemba
I. INTRODUCTION
Jamal Abdullah Kiyemba, Bisher al-Rawi, Jamil al-Banna, Shaker
Abdur-Raheem Aamer, and Omar Deghayes are currently in the custody of
the United States government at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.2 A citizen of
Uganda, an Iraqi exile, a Jordanian refugee, a Saudi citizen, and a Libyan
exile, respectively, these men form an unlikely group; yet, each share one
common trait. All five are British residents interned at Guantanamo Bay.
The plight of this group led the British media to label them "The Forgotten
Five."
4
Alleged mistreatment of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay has cre-
ated international and domestic unrest.5 This delicate situation led one in-
I B.A., State University of New York at Binghamton (2003); J.D. Case Western Reserve
University School of Law (2006). I would like to thank Associate Dean Hiram Chodosh,
Melissa Benson and William Carmines for their guidance in the development of this Note. I
would also like to thank Megan Chumetski, my parents and my sister for their support.
1 Tania Branigan & Vikram Dodd, Plea for Forgotten Men at US. Base, GuARDL N
(London), Jan. 15, 2004, at 8.
2 Nigel Morris, Guantanamo Britons Return: At Least Five British Residents Are Left
Behind in Camp Delta, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 26, 2005, at 7. As of October 12, 2005,
nine British residents are in the custody of the United States government at Guantanamo
Bay. Asim Qureshi, Report on the Status of British Residents Held in Guantanamo Bay and
the Obligation on the UK Government to Provide them Diplomatic Support,
CAGEPRISONERS.COM, Oct. 12, 2005, http://www.afterdowningstreet.org/downloads/asim3.p
df.
3 Morris, supra note 2.
4 Tony Allen-Mills, Detainee claims he was MI5 link man, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Jan.
16, 2005, at 7.
5 Omar Akbar, Note, Losing Geneva in Guantanamo Bay, 89 IowA L. REv. 195, 197
(2004).
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ternational journalist to remark, "the whole Guantanamo saga has been a
disgrace from the start and something that has sullied the reputation of the
United States the world over."6 Moreover, in memoranda to superiors, nu-
merous FBI agents allege that they witnessed aggressive interrogation prac-
tices used against the detainees.7 Detainees were "shackled to the floor in
fetal positions for more than 24 hours at a time, left without food and water,
and allowed to defecate on themselves. ,,8 Interrogators also used growl-
ing dogs, and "one detainee was wrapped in an Israeli flag and bombarded
with loud music in an apparent attempt to soften his resistance to interroga-
tion." 9 Additionally, in an August 2002 memorandum to Alberto R. Gonza-
les, Jay S. Bybee concluded that "certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or
degrading, but still not produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity
to fall within [U.S. statutory] proscription against torture."10 Notwithstand-
ing alleged abuse at Guantanamo Bay, "The Forgotten Five" remain in the
custody of the United States without formal charge."
After the death of his father, at age fourteen, Jamal Abdullah Ki-
yemba moved to Britain from his native Uganda, to be with his mother, a
British citizen. 12 He "lived in Britain for 10 years and is eligible for citizen-
ship, but has not so far applied due to an oversight."1 3 Although Kiyemba
never obtained a British passport, "[h]e has indefinite-leave to remain [in
Britain]."' 14 Born into a Roman Catholic family, Kiyemba converted to Is-
lam while a student and began to attend the Finsbury Park mosque in Lon-
don controlled by the militant cleric Abu Hamza.15 Kiyemba's detention
6 Leading Article: The Return of the Last British Detainees Will Not End the Disgrace of
Guantanamo, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 12, 2005, at 30.
7 David Eggen & R. Jeffrey Smith, FBI Agents Allege Abuse of Detainees at Guantanamo
Bay, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2004, at Al.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801 .pdf.
11 Morris, supra note 2.
12 Branigan & Dodd, supra note 1.
13 id.
14 Patrick McGowan, Another London Man Has Been Held For Nine Months at Guan-
tanamo, EVENING STANDARD (London), Aug. 1, 2003, at A2.
15 Vikram Dodd, Twelfth Briton Held in Cuba, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 1, 2003, at 11;
McGowan, supra note 14.
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may be the result of his connection to Abu Hamza and the Finsbury
mosque, but the precise conditions of his detention are unknown. 16
Similarly, Bisher al-Rawi's family left Iraq twenty-five years ago to
flee the oppression of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime. ' 7 After settling in
Britain, the entire family became citizens, with the exception of al-Rawi. 18
As the youngest member of his family, al-Rawi retained his Iraqi citizenship
so that one day his family might be able to regain assets seized by the
Ba'athists. 19 In 2002, al-Rawi traveled to The Gambia to establish a peanut-
processing business, but local authorities took him into custody upon arri-
val.20 According to the United States, al-Rawi "is detained because he ad-
mitted helping Abu Qatada, a London preacher with alleged ties to Al-
Qaeda, find an apartment, among other things.",21 Alternatively, al-Rawi
claims that he acted as a "go-between" for British intelligence and Abu
Qatada.22
In 1994, Jamil EI-Banna fled political persecution in Jordan and
was granted asylum in the United Kingdom. 23 Authorities arrested El-
Banna, a business partner of al-Rawi, along with al-Rawi in The Gambia.24
Shaker Abdur-Raheem Aamer is a Saudi citizen who moved to the
United Kingdom in 1996.25 He allegedly traveled to Afghanistan to perform
charity work, but was captured by the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and
turned over to the custody of the United States.26 The United States has
disclosed no allegation against Aamer.27
16 Cf Dodd, supra note 15 (indicating that current and former British detainees in Camp
Delta have been linked to the mosque); Sean O'Neill, How a Millfield Boy Ended Up in
Camp Delta, TIMES (London), July 10, 2004, at 9.
17 O'Neill, supra note 16.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Toni Locy, Detainees' Cases Show Another Side of Gitmo, USA TODAY, Nov. 4, 2004,
at 19A.
21 id.
22 Severin Carrell, "I was M15 Go-Between, " Says Briton Held in Guantanamo,
INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY (London), Jan. 16, 2005, at 1.
23 Victoria Brittain, The Ones Left Behind: Four Britons Were Releasedfrom Guantanamo
Bay Last Month: So Why is Jamil el Banna Still in His Cell and Why is the Government
Doing Nothing?: Victoria Brittain Meets His Family, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 19, 2005, at
22.
24 Id.
25 Morris, supra note 2.
26 id.
27 Clare Rudebeck, Family of British Resident Held at Guantanamo Appeal for His Re-
turn, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 8, 2005, at 18.
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Finally, Omar Deghayes is a "Libyan whose family [came to Britain
after fleeing] the Gaddafi regime 19 years ago.",28 Deghayes, "a partially
blind law graduate... was allegedly moved to Guantanamo Bay after being
caught by bounty hunters in Pakistan. 29
The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office ("FCO") actively
sought the release of nine British citizens held at Guantanamo Bay, but has
overlooked these men. 30 Its purpose is "to work for the [United Kingdom's]
interests in a safe, just, and prosperous world."''0 The FCO worked dili-
gently to insure that British citizens, "[e]ither be tried in accordance with
international standards or ... [be] returned to the UK.",32 In fact, the United
States released all nine British citizens from Guantanamo Bay.33 The British
government did not arrest five of these men upon their return to the United
Kingdom, but they remain on twenty-four hour surveillance. 34 The five re-
turned to their homes within days of their arrival back in the United King-
dom.35 The four final British detainees released from captivity face the
prospect of house arrest, but are currently free without charge and permitted
28 Morris, supra note 2.
29 Id.
30 Branigan & Dodd, supra note 1. See also Qureshi, supra note 2.
31 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Objec-
tives for Spending Review 2004 Period (2005-2008), http://www.fco.gov.uk/serlet
/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid= 03839880885
8. The FCO's listed objectives are (1) A world safer from global terrorism and weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), (2) Protection of the UK from illegal immigration, drug traf-
ficking and other international crime, (3) An international system based on the rule of law,
which is better able to resolve disputes and prevent conflicts, (4) An effective EU in a secure
neighbourhood, (5) Promotion of UK economic interests in an open and expanding global
economy, (6) Sustainable development, underpinned by democracy, good governance and
human rights, (7) Security of UK and global energy supplies, (8) Security and good govern-
ance of the UK's Overseas Territories, and (9) High quality consular services to British na-
tionals abroad. Effective regulation of entry to, and settlement in, the UK in the interests of
sustainable growth and social inclusion. (Entry clearance through UK Visas.). Id.
32 Jack John Whitaker Straw, Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Statement by the Foreign Secretary on Return of British
Guantanamo Detainees (Feb. 19, 2004), available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/
Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid= 1007029391629&a=KAr
ticle&aid= 1077041452790.
33 Rudebeck, supra note 27. See also Qureshi, supra note 2.
34 Patrick Hennessy & Rajeev Syal, Guantanamo Britons are Still a Threat, Says Blair
Freed Detainees Furious at PM's Warning, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 14, 2004.
35 David Williams et. al., Five Britons 'Who Are Not a Threat' Will Go Free From Camp
X-Ray, DAILY MAIL (London), Feb. 20, 2004, at 4.
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to reunite with their families.36 The United States released many of these
men despite the Pentagon's belief that they were "dangerous. 37
In stark contrast, Shaker Abdur-Raheem Aamer is currently in per-
manent solitary confinement and has not spoken to his family in eighteen
months. 38 Stafford Smith, a human rights attorney, visited Aamer in Guan-
tanamo Bay in January of 2005. 39 Smith claims that Aamer's cell was "two
and a half meters long" and that "[Aamer] was mentally unwell. 40 Unfor-
tunately for Kiyemba, al-Rawi, EI-Banna, Aamer, and Deghayes the FCO
determined that they will only "take up [the] interests" of British nation-
als. 41 Because of the alleged mistreatment of prisoners held at Guantanamo
Bay and the contrasting conditions for released British citizens in the United
Kingdom, any differential treatment raises concerns of fairness and equality.
A spokesperson for Amnesty International reported that "without the UK to
stand up for them there is a real danger that these men will be almost totally
forgotten-left to languish in legal limbo indefinitely.
4 2
This Note examines the effect citizenship status has on the deten-
tion of enemy-combatants and advocates fairness and equality in the treat-
ment of residents. Section II describes the Geneva Conventions and the dis-
tinction it draws between prisoners of war and unlawful combatants. Section
III investigates the current effect citizenship status has on detainees in inter-
national conflicts. Specifically, Section III examines disparate treatment for
citizens of the United States, citizens of countries allied with the United
States, and residents of countries allied with the United States. In doing so,
Section III explores the disparity between incarceration at Guantanamo and
detention or freedom in the United Kingdom. Section IV discuses the appli-
cability of modem and classical theories of equality to citizenship status.
Section IV also investigates whether there is a sufficiently legitimate differ-
36 Vikram Dodd et al., Freed Britons Sent Home: Clarke Unveils House Arrest Plan for
Terror Suspects, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 27, 2005, at 1.
37 Karen Mcveigh, Rights Groups Celebrate as Guantanamo Four are Released without
Charge, SCOTSMAN, Jan. 27, 2005, at 3.
38 Rudebeck, supra note 27.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Vikram Dodd, Third British Resident Held in Guantanamo Bay, GUARDIAN (London),
Aug. 1, 2003, at 6.
42 Morris, supra note 2. Asim Qureshi notes that:
The nine men are now in a legal black hole as they have no one to make any repre-
sentations on their behalf. Their countries of origin are the very places they fled in
order to find security, while the country they fled to refuse to provide them with
the protection that they deserve under the law of international human rights.
Qureshi, supra note 2.
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ence between citizens and residents to justify disparate treatment. Finally,
Section V suggests that the international community should strive toward
equal treatment of citizens and residents of the same country. Absent equal-
ity, current practices lead to arbitrary distinctions that favor some and disfa-
vor others. Section V also discusses the possibility of amending the Geneva
Conventions and other alternatives to accomplish this goal.
II. THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS ON ENEMY COMBATANTS
The international community drafted the Geneva Conventions in re-
sponse to horrific human rights violations committed during World War I
and World War 1.43 Much of the controversy regarding the detainees held
in Guantanamo Bay involves their status under the Third Geneva Conven-
tion, which address the treatment of prisoners of war.44 Specifically, a
heated debate emerged about whether the detainees are prisoners of war or
"unlawful combatants. ' 45 The Bush Administration determined that the
detainees currently in custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were not prison-
ers of war and, therefore, not afforded the full protections of the Third Ge-
neva Convention.46 Specifically, on January 9, 2002, John Yoo and Robert
J. Delahunty drafted a memorandum in which they concluded that the Ge-
neva Conventions do not apply to Al Qaeda and Taliban members in the
custody of the United States. 47 Thereafter, on January 19, 2002, the De-
partment of Defense determined that members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban
are not entitled to prisoner of war status under the Geneva Conventions. 8
43 See Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, "Unlawful Combatants" or "Prisoners of
War": The Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59, 62-66 (2003). In total,
there are four conventions: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
44 See Akbar, supra note 5.
41 See id.
46 Katherine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: The Prisoners; Powell Asks Bush to Review
Stand on War Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at 1.
47 Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, &
Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen.
Counsel, Dep't of Def., Regarding Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://antiwar.com/news/?articleid=2637 [hereinafter
Yoo-Delahunty Memo].
48 Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., Dep't of Def., to Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Status of Taliban and Al Qaeda (Jan. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622docl .pdf.
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This controversy and its context highlight the importance of rethinking the
distinction between citizenship and residence in the treatment of detainees.
A. Prisoner of War Status
The Third Geneva Convention addresses the treatment of prisoners
of war.49 Individuals entitled to prisoner of war status must fall into one of
the broad categories set forth in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Conven-
tion. 50 Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, including
members of militias or volunteer corps, receive the protections guaranteed
by the Third Geneva Convention.5' Additionally, the Third Geneva Con-
vention protects members of other militias and volunteer groups, including
organized resistance movements, if they meet four criteria. 52 First, the
group's commander must be responsible for the acts of his subordinates.53
Second, the group must have a "fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a dis-
tance. 54 Third, the group must carry any arms openly.55 Finally, the group
must "conduct its operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
war."756 Article Five of the Third Geneva Convention further provides that if
there is any doubt whether an individual belongs to the categories in Article
4 "such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until
such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal. 57
The Yoo/Delahunty memo determined that the Geneva Conventions
do not apply to Al Qaeda because it is a "non-state" actor and, therefore,
cannot be a party to the Geneva Conventions.58 Additionally, although the
memo acknowledges that Afghanistan has been a signatory to the Geneva
Conventions since 1956, it concludes that Afghanistan was a failed state
ruled "by a militia faction rather than by a government., 59 Further, the
memo found the Geneva Conventions inapplicable to the Taliban Militia
because it was "functionally indistinguishable from Al Qaeda. ' 60
Although the Yoo/Delahunty memo concludes that the Geneva
Conventions do not apply to members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the
49 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43.
50 Id. art. 4.
5' Id. art. 4(A)(1).
52 Id. art. 4(A)(2).
13 Id. art. 4(A)(1)(a).
54 Id. art. 4(A)(1)(b).
I5 d. art. 4(A)(l)(c).
56 Id. art. 4(A)(1)(d).
5' Id. art. 5.
58 Yoo-Delahunty Memo, supra note 47, at 11-14.
" Id. at 14.
60 Id. at2.
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memo indicates that, even if the Geneva Conventions did apply, members of
Al Qaeda and the Taliban are not entitled to prisoner of war status.61 In de-
termining that members of the Taliban and al Qaeda are not entitled to pris-
oner of war status, the Yoo/Delahunty memo addresses each of the four
categories above.62 Specifically, the Yoo/Delahunty memo maintains that
"Al Qaeda members have clearly demonstrated that they will not follow
these basic requirements of lawful warfare. 63 Finally, the Yoo/Delahunty
memo concludes that even if the Geneva Conventions applied to the Tali-
ban, the Taliban fails to meet the four requirements for prisoner of war
status. 64
B. "Unlawful Combatants"
Although the terms "unlawful combatant" or "enemy combatant"
do not appear in the text of either the Third or Fourth Geneva Conventions,
both terms play a crucial role in the application of the documents. The evo-
lution of modem warfare places many combatants in a situation where at-
taining prisoner of war status is extremely difficult.65 This is especially true
in the "War on Terror" where one side is not a nation, but rather an intema-
tional terrorist organization. As such, the detaining power designates indi-
viduals as unlawful combatants and they do not receive the protections of66NahneBe anidctstathe Third Geneva Convention. Professor Nathaniel Berman indicates that
the legal term for such individuals is "unprivileged combatants. 67 Their
situation is "unprivileged" because they do not receive the same protections
61 Id. at 13 & 25.
62 id.
63 Id. at 13. The memo continues:
[Members of Al Qaeda] have attacked purely civilian targets of no military value;
they refuse to wear uniform or insignia or carry arms openly, but instead high-
jacked civilian airliners, took hostages, and killed them; they have deliberately tar-
geted and killed thousands of civilians; and they themselves do not obey the laws
of war concerning the protections of the lives of civilians or the means of legiti-
mate combat.
Id.
64 Id. at 25. Specifically, "[t]he Taliban's militia's command structure probably did not
meet the first of these requirements; that the evidence strongly indicates that the requirement
of a distinctive uniform was not met; and that the requirement of conducting operations in
accordance with the law and customs of armed conflicts is not met." Id.
65 Melysa H. Sperber, Note, John Walker Lindh and Yaser Esam Hamdi: Closing the
Loophole in International Humanitarian Law for American Nationals Captured Abroad
While Fighting with Enemy Forces, 40 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 159, 167 (2003).
66 Id. at 167.
67 Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Con-
struction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 14 (2004). Berman is a Professor of Law at
Brooklyn Law School.
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as prisoners of war.68 The most significant difference between prisoners of
war and "unlawful combatants" is that "unlawful combatants" "may be
prosecuted for taking up arms against an enemy power."
69
While "unlawful combatants" do not receive the same treatment as
prisoners of war under international law, opinions differ on whether the
Fourth Geneva Convention, which addresses the protection of civilians in
time of war, protects "unlawful combatants". One view is that individuals
engaged in fighting are clearly not civilians and, therefore, they fall outside
the protections enumerated in the Fourth Geneva Convention. 70 However,
others believe that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to "unlawful
combatants." 7' Human Rights Watch believes that "'nonprivileged' or
'unlawful' combatants are protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention,
customary international law and, where applicable, Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions. 72 Finally, the commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention
indicates:
[E]very person in enemy hands must have some status under international
law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the Third Con-
vention, a civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a member
of the medical personnel of the armed forces who is covered by the First
Convention. 73
The Comment continues "' [t]here is no' intermediate status; nobody in en-
emy hands can be outside the law.",74 Despite these arguments, and where
an individual falls under the Geneva Conventions, their citizenship status
may play a role in their treatment by the detaining power.
III. THE CURRENT EFFECT OF CITIZENSHIP STATUS ON DETAINEES IN
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
The word "citizen" does not appear in either the Third or Fourth
Geneva Convention. However, both the Third and Fourth Geneva Conven-
tions employ a nationality framework. Article 16 of the Third Geneva Con-
vention states, "all prisoners of war shall be treated alike by the Detaining
68 Id.
69 Alejandra Rodriguez, Note, Is the War on Terrorism Compromising Civil Liberties? A
Discussion ofHamdi and Padilla, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 379, 387 (2003).
70 Sperber, supra note 65, at 167.
71 Rodriguez, supra note 69, at 387.
72 Background Paper on Geneva Conventions and Persons Held by U.S. Forces, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, Jan. 29, 2002, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/pow-bck.htm.
73 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION IV OF 1949 RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIMES OF WAR 4 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter Commentary on
Fourth Geneva Convention].
74 Id.
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Power, without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious
belief or political opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar crite-
ria."7 5 Similarly, Article 13 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states:
[T]he provisions of Part II [addressing the general protection of popula-
tions against certain consequences of war] cover the whole of the popula-
tions of the countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in
particular, on race, nationality, religion or political opinion, and are in-
tended to alleviate the sufferings caused by war.76
In fact, "every major international humanitarian legal instrument" contains a
prohibition against discrimination based upon nationality.77
These provisions indicate that a detaining power may not make ad-
verse distinctions based on nationality. 78 However, these provisions of non-
discrimination fail to provide definitive guidance. 79 The detainees in Guan-
tanamo Bay receive differential treatment based upon whether they are
United States citizens, citizens of allies of the United States, or citizens of
all other countries.80 Specifically, an individual's citizenship may enable
them to secure release from Guantanamo Bay.8' The international commu-
nity must address this inequality and strive towards the elimination of dispa-
rate treatment based upon citizenship status.
A. United States Citizens
United States citizens have rights enumerated in the United States
Constitution. As the United States is the detaining power in Guantanamo
Bay, individuals with United States citizenship will likely never see the
inside of a cell at Guantanamo Bay.8 2 For example, the United States gov-
ernment never detained John Walker Lindh, the so-called "American Tali-
ban" at Guantanamo Bay.83 At the age of sixteen Lindh converted to Islam
75 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, art. 16.
76 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 43, art. 13.
77 Sperber, supra note 65, at 167.
78 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, art. 16; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra
note 43, art. 13; Sperber, supra note 65, at 167.
79 Sperber, supra note 65, at 167.
80 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004);
Branigan & Dodd, supra note 1.
81 Branigan & Dodd, supra note 1.
82 An evaluation of citizenship status and the United States Constitution is beyond the
breadth of this Note. This Note focuses on citizenship status and international law. In a situa-
tion where another country was the detaining power, United States citizens may not receive
protections enumerated in the United States Constitution.
83 Evelyn Nieves, A Nation Challenged: The American Fighter: A US. Converts Path
From Suburbia to a Gory Jailfor Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at B 1.
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and by twenty, the United States government alleged that he took up arms
against the United States with the Taliban. 84 Raised in Marin County, Cali-
fornia, Lindh eventually arrived in "Alexandria, Virginia, where he was to
be tried in a civilian criminal court for conspiring to kill Americans., 85 All
the while, "the military was holding ... foreign-born Taliban and Al Qaeda
prisoners at a military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 8-foot-by-8-foot
chain link cages."
86
Similarly, Yaser Esam Hamdi was born in Louisiana, but moved to
Saudi Arabia as a child before he eventually moved to Afghanistan.87 In
2001, the Northern Alliance captured Hamdi in Afghanistan and turned him
over to the United States. 88 In 2002, the United States government trans-
ferred Hamdi to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 89 Later that year, after confirma-
tion that he was an American citizen, Hamdi was transferred from Guan-
tanamo Bay to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia, and later to a brig in
Charleston, South Carolina." 90 When Hamdi's father filed a writ of habeas
corpus, the Supreme Court of the United States held that, "although Con-
gress authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circumstances
alleged here, due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as
an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the fac-
tual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker."
91
B. Citizens of Countries Allied with the United States
Although citizens of countries allied with the United States may
spend significant time at Guantanamo Bay, in many instances their coun-
tries have pressured the United States and secured their release. At one time,
nine British citizens were in the custody of the United States at Guantanamo
Bay.92 A statement by the British Foreign Secretary reveals that the British
Government was in constant contact with the United States regarding de-
84 id.
85 David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953,953 (2002).
86 Id. According to the American Forces Press Service, as of January 10, 2006, approxi-
mately 500 detainees are in the custody of the United States government at Guantanamo Bay.
Press Release, Am. Forces Press Serv., Detention Puts Terrorists Out of Action, DoD Offi-
cial Says (Jan. 10, 2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/
20060110_3884.html.
87 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
88 Id.
89 id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 509.
92 Statement by the Foreign Secretary on Return of British Guantanamo Detainees, supra
note 32.
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tainees with British citizenship. 93 Further, British authorities visited Guan-
tanamo Bay on numerous occasions. 94 Finally, the FCO kept the families of
these detainees and parliament informed and successfully negotiated the
release of all British citizens.
95
In March 2004, the United States determined that five British citi-
zens did not pose a terrorist threat and that they could obtain no more in-
formation from these men. 96 The British government secured the release of
four other British citizens in February 2005 despite the Pentagon's belief
that they were "dangerous." 97 These developments indicate that citizenship
may play a crucial role in release from Guantanamo Bay. While a policy to
release all British citizens is apparent, "The Forgotten Five" remain in cap-
tivity, possibly indefinitely. Disparate treatment of this nature violates fun-
damental principles of equality and, therefore, the international community
should not allow it to persist.
The reasons given for the release of the nine British Citizens poses
an important issue. However, more important is the fact that the British
government negotiated their release. The British government denies Jamal
Abdullah Kiyemba, Bisher al-Rawi, Jamil Al-Banna, Shaker Abdur-
Raheem Aamer, and Omar Deghayes this opportunity. As such, they remain
in Guantanamo Bay, charged with no formal crime and with no government
to lobby on their behalf. If nothing else, political pressure from the British
Government might force a reevaluation of their threat level.
C. Residents and Others
Jamal Abdullah Kiyemba, Bisher al-Rawi, Jamil Al-Banna, Shaker
Abdur-Raheem Aamer, and Omar Deghayes are residents of the United
Kingdom. Their status as residents of the United Kingdom might be benefi-
cial considering that the British government secured the release of all nine
British citizens in Guantanamo Bay. To the contrary, the British govern-
ment refuses to help these men because "they were not traveling on a UK
passport" when taken into custody.98 Jack Straw, Secretary of State for For-
eign and Commonwealth Affairs, indicated that "[w]e can represent British
citizens ... [but] we cannot represent those who choose not to seek British
citizenship and make their own choices presumably because they want to
maintain the citizenship of their birth." 99 Thus, these men "are now in a
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.; Rudebeck, supra note 27.
96 Williams et al., supra note 35.
97 Mcveigh, supra note 37.
98 Morris, supra note 2.
99 Qureshi, supra note 2.
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legal black hole as they have no one to make any representations on their
behalf. Their countries of origin are the very places they fled in order to find
security, while the country they fled to refuses to provide them with the
protection that they deserve. ... "100
Likewise, citizens of countries that have hostile relations with the
United States and citizens of countries who take no interest in the situation
at Guantanamo Bay have no government to lobby on their behalf and likely
will remain in custody indefinitely. Further, developing a "more permanent
approach for potentially lifetime detentions" is underway at top levels of the
Bush administration. 1 01 Such a policy may include "hundreds of people now
in military and CIA custody whom the government does not have enough
evidence to charge in courts."' 10 2 Groups including the ACLU and Amnesty
International certainly lobby on behalf of the detainees, but these groups
clearly do not wield the same influence or political clout as an allied gov-
ernment. Absent sufficient legal protections and voices to pressure, dispa-
rate treatment persists for residents at Guantanamo Bay.
The current approach to citizenship status leads to arbitrary distinc-
tions that favor some and disfavor others. This disparate treatment under-
mines the legitimacy of international law. Accordingly, the international
community should incorporate notions of fairness and equality to citizen-
ship status and its effect on the detention of enemy combatants.
IV. A DOCTRINE OF EQUALITY
A. Theories of Equality
Modem and classical philosophy often address the subject of equal-
ity. John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, 0 3 argues that justice requires that
social institutions developed by society should not create unfair advantages
for some at the expense of others. 104 In order to create an arena of fairness
and equality, institutions or conventions set up by the international commu-
nity should adhere to this principle. Furthermore, the absence of equality in
application undermines the legitimacy of international law.'0 5 Specifically,
Professor Ronald Dworkin argues that fairness, justice, and integrity "con-
100 Id.
101 Dana Priest, Long-Term Plan Sought For Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2005, at
Al.
102 Id.
103 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
104 Id.
105 See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705,
709 (1988).
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duce to the rule of law."' 10 6 The Geneva Conventions currently fail to pre-
vent the creation of unfair advantages in Guantanamo Bay. By failing to
address citizenship directly, the Geneva Conventions allow the British gov-
ernment to draw adverse distinctions based on citizenship status. Critics
might argue that the British government cannot lobby on behalf of everyone
who requests their services. While this may be true of individuals with no
attachments to Britain, Britain has a responsibility to residents of the United
Kingdom because the distinction between citizens and residents is not suffi-
cient to justify disparate treatment. Edward Davey, MP for Bisher al-Rawi's
constituency of Kingston and Surbiton, believes that, "after 19 years... the
British government has an utter moral obligation to Bisher, and their failure
to recognize that is chilling and quite spineless."' 10 7
In Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 108 German philoso-
pher Immanuel Kant laid out three categorical imperatives. The imperatives
are:
(1) Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time
will that it should become a universal law;
(2) Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always
at the same time as an end; and
(3) All maxims as proceeding from our own [hypothetical] making of law
ought to harmonize with a possible Kingdom of ends. 1
09
These Kantian imperatives would preclude all war. However, because soci-
ety has yet to shed itself from the horrors of violence and war, this Note
does not address that utopian topic. Kant's categorical imperatives clearly
reject the utilitarian notion of detaining the potentially innocent for the
greater good of society. 10 Such behavior would treat the detained as a
means, rather than an end in itself. Nevertheless, how would Kantian theory
address the disparate treatment of detained individuals based upon their
citizenship status?
When the international community creates a convention, it should
"will" that the principles under that convention should become universal
law. Universal application of international principles assures that the inter-
national community cannot condone disparate treatment. Specifically, the
106 Id. at 709 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-224 (1986). Dworkin is Profes-
sor of Philosophy and Frank Henry Sommer Professor of Law at New York University.
Additionally, Dworkin has been Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford and Fellow of Univer-
sity College since 1969.
107 Branigan & Dodd, supra note 1.
108 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785).
109 Id.
110 Cole, supra note 85, at 1798.
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international community should approach nationality and citizenship status
with principles of universality. Such an approach prevents detaining powers
from drawing adverse distinctions and promotes the legitimacy of interna-
tional actions. Absent universal application, questions of inequality and
disparate application may emerge. Further, the United States has an incen-
tive to promote the universal application of international agreements to as-
sure that when other countries detain United States citizens, they do not
receive disparate treatment based upon their citizenship status.
While universal application may not be appropriate in all circum-
stances, the differences between citizens and residents fails to reach a level
necessary to justify disparate treatment. In United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez,1"' Chief Justice William Rehnquist recognized that "aliens re-
ceive [U.S.] constitutional protections when they have come within the ter-
ritory of the United States and developed substantial connections with the
country." ' 1 2 Despite their substantial voluntary connection to the United
Kingdom, the government of the United Kingdom does not extend "The
Forgotten Five" the benefit of this standard. 113
Under classical Social Contract Theory, individuals give up certain
rights to a sovereign in order to live in a civil society. 114 In return for sub-
mission of their rights, the government agrees to enforce the contract be-
tween individuals of society.115 Thus, an argument against equal treatment
of citizens and residents is that the government may have an obligation to its
citizens through social contract ideas; but they have no obligation to resi-
dents with whom they arguably have not entered into a social contract.
However, John Locke argued that, "consent to government may be express
or tacit." 1 6 Locke explained that "[e]xpress consent consists of some mani-
festation of a 'positive [e]ngagement' with a political society, and tacit con-
"' United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
112 Id. The full quote reads:
"Verdugo-Urquidez also relies on a series of cases in which we have held that
aliens enjoy certain constitutional rights. These cases, however, establish only that
aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory
of the United States and developed substantial connections with the country. Re-
spondent is an alien who has had no previous significant voluntary connection with
the United States, so these cases avail him not."
Id. at 270-271 (citations omitted).
113 Reasonable minds may disagree regarding the meaning of "substantial connection." The
remainder of this Note uses the "significant voluntary connection" language of Chief Justice
Rehnquist in Verdugo-Urquidez.
114 See Ethan Fishman, Loper, Begging and Civic Virtue, 46 ALA. L. REv. 783 (1995).
115 See id.
116 Steven J. Burr, Immigration and the First Amendment, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1889, 1913
n.177 (1985).
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sent consists of any contact with a society that results in a person's enjoying
any of the benefits of living under the government of that society." 117 Ap-
plying Locke's theory to residents, "resident aliens may be said to tacitly
consent" to be governed.118 By tacitly consenting, residents enter into the
social contract and gain the rights thereto. Thus, applying social contract
theory, the British government has a moral obligation to represent "The
Forgotten Five" as Edward Davey suggests." 9
Additionally, the difference between citizens and residents is not
sufficiently legitimate to justify adverse distinctions because the separation
between citizens and residents is too attenuated to justify the distinction. To
elaborate, the main difference, that residents have not applied for citizen-
ship, is not a sufficient justification for disparate treatment. Many residents
are loyal law abiding individuals who may have legitimate reasons to main-
tain their current citizenship status. Bisher al-Rawi's desire to remain at-
tached with his ancestry and the possibility to reclaim their assets is one
legitimate reason among many. Further, as examined below, citizenship is
not always easily attainable and many countries do not offer dual citizen-
ship. With these considerations in mind, disparate treatment is not justified
based upon minute differences between citizens and residents. This is espe-
cially true when these residents have indefinite leave to stay.
A doctrine of equality for citizens and residents could have adverse
consequences for detainees. For instance, equal treatment may mean treat-
ing all combatants-no matter where they are from-equally poorly. Pro-
fessor Kenneth Simons indicates that "equality is a distinctively flexible
norm: normally the decisionmaker may either 'level up' or 'level down' the
benefits or burdens at issue, in order to rectify, or avoid creating, the ine-
quality." 120 The practice of "leveling down" occurs in the lawmaking proc-
ess. '21 For instance, in the United States, calls for equal educational oppor-
tunities have sometimes resulted in "leveling down" spending in wealthier
schools rather than leveling up funding in poorer schools. 22 Human Rights
Groups are unlikely to favor "leveling down." However, "leveling down" is
still preferable to a system where combatants are subject to adverse treat-
ment based upon their citizenship status. At the very least, ambiguous safe-
guards can be replaced with clear-cut protections.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Branigan & Dodd, supra note 1.
120 Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U. L. REv. 693, 721 (2000).
Simmons is a Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law.
121 See Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1210 (1997).
122 Id. at 1263 n.84.
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B. Similarly situated Individuals
Many theories of equality seek to treat similarly situated individuals
alike. In the context of citizenship status, the question becomes whether
citizens of different countries are similarly situated. Furthermore, are citi-
zens and residents of the same countries similarly situated? If the answers to
the above questions are yes, then the analysis may be easy. However, if the
answers are no, one must assess whether dissimilar citizenship is suffi-
ciently significant to justify disparate treatment.
In his dissent in Hamdi, Justice Scalia argued that, "Citizens and
non-citizens, even if equally dangerous, are not similarly situated."'' 2 3 No
mention of residents appears in Scalia's dissent. 124 The majority focused on
"individuals" rather than citizenship and argued that citizenship was irrele-
vant to the detention of enemy combatants. 125 Citizenship may be irrelevant
to whether an enemy combatant can be detained; however, current interna-
tional standards allow it to be relevant to chances of release. The British
government exemplifies this disparate treatment by failing to represent and
negotiate on the behalf of residents of the United Kingdom. Further, al-
though United States law may permit a distinction between citizens and
non-citizens, international social institutions should not perpetuate such
distinctions to avoid questions of legitimacy. A better approach is to have a
definitive prohibition on distinctions based upon citizenship status.
Another issue is that citizenship status is a mutable trait. Unlike
race or age, a person has the constrained ability to change his or her citizen-
ship status. As such, one might argue that individuals have the power to
choose which citizenship status they shall enjoy and, therefore, they must
accept the consequences of their choice. This argument assumes that citi-
zenship status is always easily attainable. On the contrary, in many coun-
tries acquiring citizenship can be quite difficult. In the United States, some
of the requirements of naturalization are:
a period of continuous residence and physical presence in the United
States; residence in a particular USCIS District prior to filing; an ability to
read, write, and speak English; a knowledge and understanding of U.S.
history and government; good moral character; attachment to the princi-
ples of the U.S. Constitution; and favorable disposition toward the United
States." 126
..3 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 575 n.5 (2004).
124 Id. at 554-78.
125 Juliet Stumpf, Citizens of an Enemy Land: Enemy Combatants, Aliens, and the Consti-
tutional Rights of the Pseudo-Citizen, 38 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 79, 129 (2004).
126 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Naturalization, http://uscis.gov/graphics/
services/natz/index.htm.
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Similarly, foreign applicants for British citizenship must:
have lived legally in the United Kingdom for five years (the last year
should have been free of any time limit); be 18 or over; not be of unsound
mind; be of good character; have sufficient knowledge of English, Welsh
or Scottish Gaelic (depending on their age and physical and mental condi-
tion); and stay closely connected with the United Kingdom. 127
Hurdles like these can make attaining citizenship status an arduous task.
A second argument for dissimilar treatment based upon citizenship
status contends, "[t]he very essence of war involves the drawing of lines in
the sand between citizens of our country and those against whom we are
fighting."'' 28 The bright line suggested by this argument fails to give ade-
quate weight to the proximity between citizens and residents. Furthermore,
modem warfare, especially the "War on Terror," is not necessarily between
two countries with distinct sets of citizens. Professor David Cole advocates
resisting the "double standard" that exists for citizens and non-citizens be-
cause "political freedom, due process, and equal protection of the laws...
are human rights, not privileges of citizenship and ought to apply whenever
we seek to impose legal obligations on persons."'' 29 This view starkly con-
trasts with the current U.S. treatment of the detainees in Guantanamo Bay.
Finally, the distinction between citizens and residents is too attenu-
ated to justify disparate treatment. First, the differences between citizens
and residents are not always stark. For example, Bisher al-Rawi lived in
Briton for more than twenty-five years before his incarceration. He likely
has more of an affiliation with Britain than an individual who recently
gained citizenship. Regardless, applying the Lockean theory of tacit con-
sent, "The Forgotten Five" have entered into social contracts with the Brit-
ish government and, therefore, the government has a moral obligation to
represent them.
V. AN AMICABLE SOLUTION
The United States determination that the Geneva Conventions do
not apply to members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban is a source of constant
debate. 30 The nature of modem warfare plays a pivotal role in the contro-
versy surrounding the application of the Conventions.' 31 It has been over
127 Home Office, BN1 - British Citizenship, http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/en/h
ome/applying/british nationality/adviceaboutnationality/bnl lbritishcitizenship.html.
128 Cole, supra note 85, at 957. David Cole is a Professor of Law at the Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center.
129 Id.
130 See id.
131 Joshua S. Clover, Note, "Remember, We're The Good Guys": The Classification and
Trial of the Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 45 S. TEX. L. REv. 351, 366-67 (2004).
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fifty years since the drafting of the Geneva Conventions. Since then the
Conventions have not changed, save for two protocols adopted in 1977, to
which the U.S. is not a signatory. 132 The Geneva Conventions sought to
establish rules for a different type of conflict. Some wars are now waged
without regards to borders or governments. In certain instances, conflicts
have moved off the battlefield and into the streets of society. International
organizations, rather than specific countries, can carry out attacks. Accord-
ingly, the international community should reexamine and modernize the
Geneva Conventions in an effort to avoid future complications.
An area of specific importance is the non-discrimination provisions
of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. 133 These provisions protect
prisoners of war and civilians from discrimination based upon national-
ity. 134 "Unlawful Combatants" do not fall within either of these two catego-
ries. 135 Thus, they are arguably unprotected from adverse distinctions based
upon their citizenship status. However, as the Commentary to the Fourth
Geneva Convention indicates, "'there is no' intermediate status; nobody in
enemy hands can be outside the law."' 136 Currently, no matter where an in-
dividual falls under the Geneva Conventions, their citizenship status may
play a role in their treatment by the detaining power. In an effort to promote
justice and equality, the international community should expand the non-
discrimination provisions in the Geneva Conventions to prevent disparate
treatment based upon citizenship status to all individuals in the hands of the
enemy. Inserting fairness, justice, and integrity into the detention of "unlaw-
ful combatants" promotes the legitimacy of international law. 37 Thus, re-
gardless of an individual's status under the Conventions, adverse distinc-
tions based upon citizenship status should be prohibited.
A. Amending the Geneva Conventions
The situations of Kiyemba, al-Rawi, Al-Banna, Aamer, and
Deghayes exemplify the problem of disparate treatment based on citizenship
status. The British government's ability to ignore their situation, and the
132 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [here-
inafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protections of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S.609 [hereinafter Protocol II].
133 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, art. 16; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra
note 43, art. 13.
134 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, art. 16; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra
note 43, art. 13.
135 See Berman, supra note 67.
136 Commentary on Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 73.
137 Franck, supra note 105, at 709.
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United States determination that the Conventions do not apply to members
of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, demonstrates that the Geneva Conventions fail
to prevent disparate treatment based on citizenship status. This disparity
undermines the legitimacy of equality in international law. Most notably,
conventions set up by the international community should not create unfair
advantages for some at the expense of others based upon citizenship status.
Although the Geneva Conventions fail to provide this protection,
the document should not simply be discarded. A better course is to amend
the Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Conventions do not provide a proce-
dure for amendment. However, Article 97 of the Protocol I provides an
amendment process. 138 This process provides that: "Any High Contracting
Party may propose amendments to this Protocol." 139 Protocol I continues,
"the text of any proposed amendment shall be communicated to the deposi-
tary, which shall decide, after consultation with all the High Contracting
Parties and the International Committee of the Red Cross, whether a confer-
ence should be convened to consider the proposed amendment." 140 Further,
"the depositary shall invite to that conference all the High Contracting Par-
ties as well as the Parties to the Conventions, whether or not they are signa-
tories of this Protocol."1 4 1 Finally, Comment 3780 to Protocol I recognizes
that "[i]t should be noted that this article only deals with amendments to the
Protocol. However, a procedure for amending the Conventions could-as
they do not contain a provision to this effect-apply this article by analogy.
,142
Amending a document signed by numerous nations would obvi-
ously be a complex undertaking. However, the task is not insurmountable
for three reasons. First, the international community has an incentive to
avoid apparent disparate treatment. Cries of improper treatment surround
the situation in Guantanamo Bay. 143 Amending the Conventions to prevent
disparate treatment based on citizenship status would be a step forward in
the treatment of the detainees in Guantanamo Bay. Second, nations like
Britain will have to address the problem of residents eventually. Constant
lobbying from human rights groups and pressure from the detainees' fami-
lies cannot remain unheard forever. As such, addressing the problem on an
international level allows countries like Britain to avoid undertaking the
138 Protocol I, supra note 132, art. 97.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id .
142 Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/0/52db59a9afda5af5cl2563cd004
38554?OpenDocument.
143 See Akbar, supra note 5.
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problem alone. Finally, the procedural hurdles for amendment in Article 97
of Protocol I are not difficult to meet.44
Once the international community establishes incentives to amend,
it can proceed with amending the Geneva Conventions. One course of ac-
tion is to add an article to each Convention that provides a blanket prohibi-
tion on discrimination based upon citizenship status. This principle of non-
discrimination must extend to all individuals in the custody of a detaining
power, regardless of their status under the conventions because "nobody in
enemy hands can be outside the law."' 145 By doing so the international
community can take a significant stance against disparate treatment based
upon citizenship status.
B. Alternative Solutions
An alternative solution is to add a third protocol to the original con-
ventions. The international community has added two protocols to the Ge-
neva Conventions since 1949.146 Thus, one benefit to adding an additional
protocol is that the international community is already familiar with the
process. Accordingly, this solution may prove easier logistically. However,
some countries may resist an entirely new document and refuse to sign the
agreement. For instance, the United States has not ratified the two protocols
additional to the Geneva Conventions. 147 Political pressure and the desire to
avoid future complications in the application of the Geneva Conventions
may provide a valuable incentive for reluctant countries.
A second alternative to amending the Geneva Conventions is to
create an arena for the nation of citizenship and nation of residence to work
together to address the problem. For example, Britain and Uganda could
collectively address Jamal Abdullah Kiyemba's detention in Guantanamo
Bay. An advantage of this approach is that part of the burden of addressing
the problem is removed from the country of residence. For example, Britain
would not bear exclusive responsibility for its residents. A second advan-
tage is that this alternative avoids the ratification and adoption concerns that
arise in alternative solutions.
This approach presents three problems. First, Uganda does not have
the resources or political power of Britain. As a result, the United States
may not take political pressure from Uganda as seriously as it would take
political pressure from a more powerful ally. However, Uganda can avoid
this problem if it acts in concert with Britain. Second, Uganda may not care
or may not be in a position to commit resources to the process. Louise
144 Protocol I, supra note 132, art. 97.
145 Commentary on Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 73.
146 Protocol I, supra note 132; Protocol I1, supra note 132.
147 Protocol I, supra note 132; Protocol II, supra note 132.
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Christian, attorney for Jamal Abdullah Kiyemba acknowledges that, "trying
to get Uganda to take an interest is pretty difficult."1 48 Other countries that
must address numerous domestic issues may be in a similar position regard-
ing their detained citizens. Finally, the logistics of organizing a forum for
the countries to meet and compelling their presence could prove overly bur-
densome.
A third alternative is to allow combatants to apply for citizenship
from within Guantanamo Bay. Jamal Abdullah Kiyemba's attorney "is ask-
ing the government to help him apply for citizenship from within the U.S.
naval base because the Foreign Office refuses to help non-Britons." 149 This
could avoid the problem entirely because "a successful application would
force the government to take responsibility for him." 5 0
Although promising, governments are unlikely to be receptive to
Guantanamo applicants because of their alleged affiliation with Al Qaeda or
the Taliban. Further, it may be politically unwise for governments to permit
detainees to gain citizenship from within Guantanamo Bay. The story of
Abdurahman Khadr, a Canadian citizen released from Guantanamo Bay,
illustrates this point. Since his release and return to Canada, Khadr has re-
ceived many threatening phone calls and 10,000 Canadian citizens have
signed an online petition demanding the removal of Khadr and his family
from the country.' 5' Further, in the case of Britain, the "Home Office staff
do not have access to [Guantanamo Bay], while the [FCO] insists that citi-
zenship applications are Home Office responsibility."' 152 Finally, it may be
burdensome for countrics to process numerous requests for citizenship.
Specifically, would permission to apply for citizenship status be limited to
residents or could any individual apply for citizenship from within Guan-
tanamo Bay?
Finally, the United Nations ("U.N.") could address inequality in the
detention of enemy combatants. The U.N. may be the most appropriate fo-
rum to address this international issue because one of its purposes is "to
achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character .... 153 However, the
General Assembly can only make recommendations regarding human rights
148 Branigan & Dodd, supra note 1.
149 Id.
15o Id.
151 Colin Freeze, Khadrs' Citizenship Fuels Public Outcry, GLOBE AND MAIL (Canada),
Apr. 17, 2004. Such threats include messages stating: "You're not wanted in this country...
. Get the hell out of this country, you bastards .... I thought maybe by now you'd get the
hell out of here and take off back to Pakistan with your al-Qaeda friends .... Id.
152 Branigan & Dodd, supra note 1.
1 U.N. Charter pmbl.
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and has "no power to take binding decisions." 154 Thus, the General Assem-
bly is unlikely to contribute the necessary initiative on its own. Moreover,
concerns of unilateral and isolationist actions by member nations could un-
dermine such efforts. Specifically, one of the five permanent members of
the U.N. Security Council (Peoples Republic of China, France, Russian
Federation, United States, and United Kingdom) could veto a potential ini-
tiative. 155 Thus, pursuing a policy of non-discrimination through the U.N.
could prove an extremely strenuous task.
VI. CONCLUSION
The nature of modern warfare generates controversy surrounding
the application of the Geneva Conventions. Specifically, the "War on Ter-
ror," which can involve international terrorist organizations rather than state
actors, creates confusion regarding the applicability of the Geneva Conven-
tions. Because of this uncertainty, prisoner of war status can be extremely
difficult to attain. Thus, many individuals are designated "unlawful combat-
ants" and not protected by the Geneva Conventions. Moreover, the Geneva
Conventions, in their current capacity, fail to deliver equal treatment to per-
sons of diverse citizenship. As a result, a detaining power can treat members
of the same group that take up arms differently based upon the citizenship
status they can prove. Specifically, this Note demonstrates that United
States citizens, citizens from countries allied with the United States, and
citizens of all other countries currently receive differential treatment in the
"War on Terror." The predicament of "The Forgotten Five" illustrates the
disparate treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay. While some argue that
these individuals are not similarly situated, the theories of equality pre-
sented indicate that, as an institution, international law should not allow
individuals to have an unfair advantage based upon a characteristic such as
citizenship status. Absent equality, current practices lead to arbitrary dis-
tinctions that favor some and disfavor others. The international community
can correct existing inequalities in numerous ways. Amending and strength-
ening the Geneva Conventions to prevent countries from drawing adverse
distinctions between citizens and residents is the most appropriate response.
Principles of non-discrimination should extend to all individuals in the cus-
tody of a detaining power, regardless of their status under the conventions.
Finally, although the cages at Guantanamo may one day be unlocked, prin-
154 Lewis Saideman, Do Palestinian Refugees Have a Right of Return to Israel? An Exami-
nation of the Scope of and Limitations On the Right of Return, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 829, 835
n. 19 (2004).
155 See generally Craig Hammer, Reforming the U.N. Security Council: Open Letter to
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 261 (2002).
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ciples of equality must continue to play a role in international law to secure
its legitimacy.
